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Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) became Mexico’s president on 
1 December 2018. Despite some signs of tension, 100 days later his approval 
rates surpass 80 per cent. It is too early to see signs of the transformation 
he proclaimed to start. Yet, his approach to solving Mexico’s toughest prob-
lems and his political communication style differentiate from previous gov-
ernments.
 • The priorities for the new government – and those where voters expect deliv-
ery – are social policies and internal security.
 • While domestic and foreign investors are on edge after AMLO’s campaign as-
sertions that he would backpedal on some of the reforms made by the previous 
government, the peso has been stable and his government has pledged to con-
tinue pursuing multilateralism and open markets. Still, anxieties among inves-
tors might affect the prospects of the Mexican economy just as much as the 
government’s actions do. 
 • Migration is a complex phenomenon in Mexico, occupying the headlines for 
the last five months due to caravans hailing from Central America. Policies to 
deal with migration are undergoing change because of that. At the same time, 
migration is becoming a nodal point to connect the government’s plans for in-
frastructure development for the impoverished south of the country with its 
foreign policy projections in the region.
 • Despite fundamental change in other areas, the new government’s agenda so 
far has omitted concerns for gender equality, the environment, or the risks of 
the military gaining a stronger hold on the security apparatus.
Policy Implications
AMLO’s plans enjoy ample support, but his style bears mixed signals for democ-
racy. As he seeks popular backing by both institutional and extra-institutional 
means, participation and accountability may grow at the expense of checks and 
balances. Internal and international actors should play a supportive role for this 
government’s aims, yet also to attentively check the methods used – especially 
regarding the implementation of social and internal security policies.
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The Onset of a Transformation
The astounding victory – with 53 per cent of the vote – of Andrés Manuel López 
Obrador (AMLO) in the last presidential elections in Mexico, held on 3 July 2018, 
provoked a seismic change in the country’s political system. The incumbent Insti-
tutional revolutionary Party (PrI) was ousted by electoral means, and the elec-
toral force of other parties that had allowed it to govern and achieve far-reaching 
reforms (the national Action Party and Party of the Democratic revolution) was 
also seriously damaged. In his five months as president-elect, under a “lame duck” 
Peña Nieto, AMLO sent further shock waves through the system. For instance, he 
announced the cancellation of the most important infrastructure project started 
by the previous government (Texcoco airport) and instead proposed several plans 
for other infrastructure ones of his own as well as consultation in survey-like exer-
cises that lacked the backing of the national electoral authority. Prodigious expec-
tations – positive and negative – have accompanied his taking of office, but after 
100 days there is little concrete to be said about a definite direction to AMLo’s 
government – much less its accomplishments. he has promised nothing less than 
transformation, [1] to pacify the country and to reduce deeply rooted inequality. So 
far, his government has focused on social policy and efforts to curb corruption and 
is having trouble tackling public security.
AMLO’s Style: Old Wine in New Bottles?
An analysis of the current government’s position towards democratic institutions 
must begin before it even took office. AMLo’s landslide triumph is also one of demo-
cratic elections as the channel for a peaceful yet radical change of political course – at 
least as groundbreaking as it can be in a country where most political parties aspire 
to occupying the centre of the political spectrum. AMLo’s style of addressing “the 
people” directly, seen on top of the comfortable legislative majority he enjoys with 
Morena (Movimiento regeneración nacional) and its allies (which obtained an ab-
solute majority in both chambers of Congress), raises fears that he will concentrate 
power to the detriment of other powers and institutions, and that he could try to 
restore the clientelistic practices and strongman style of politics of the old PrI – the 
party with whom he started his career. 
Yet, the political system that made it possible for AMLO to become president 
after two failed attempts is no longer the same as it was under the hegemonic rule 
of the PrI. In fact, the PrI government of Peña nieto (2012–1018), with nefarious 
corruption at all levels, shattered any belief voters had in 2012 in the incumbent 
party’s methods and competence to restore peace. After more than two decades of 
democratisation, an organised political and civil society has fought to install checks 
and balances in the system. Also, despite several measures by previous govern-
ments to steer the media for presidential propaganda purposes, the media land-
scape in Mexico remains strong and diverse. The pluralism of Mexican society today 
might be hard to manage for the new president, but it is certainly powerful enough 
that he needs to attune his style to it. And yet it is precisely his style of doing and 
communicating politics which is an identifiable avenue of change in comparison to 
previous governments, and one that calls for close observation. 
 
1 Andrés Manuel López 
Obrador promised a histor-
ical “fourth transformation” 
for Mexico (independence 
in the 1810s being the first, 
the reformative period in 
the late 1850s being the 
second, and the revolution 
of the 1910s being the 
third). His government is 
thus commonly referred to 
as the “4T.”
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In principle, there is nothing threatening to democratic institutions in the early 
morning conferences that have quickly become a routine of the new president, consist-
ent with his previous stint as mayor of Mexico City several years ago. Without inter-
mediaries the president addresses the people, stating the items on his agenda – with 
cabinet members mostly reduced to bystanders. Several observers note that this 
leads to unnecessary wear and tear on his political capital, as it is obvious that he 
cannot possibly command expertise over the whole range of topics about which 
journalists ask him on the spot. still, AMLo trusts his reputation as a social leader 
enough to allow himself to err openly, admitting mistakes in his policies and an-
nouncing corrections during those conferences – but at times also appears tired and 
irritable, and often openly antagonises people and institutions. With such exposure 
to improvised interaction, the president gives the impression of taking important 
decisions single-handedly – and erratically. What some read as populist political 
propaganda, he defends as a keystone of the “right of the people to be informed.” 
Be it as it may, his style resonates with many of his voters and gives many others 
much to debate every day. endearingly, AMLo holds such conferences with mini-
mum security, characteristic of his overall means of conducting himself – he has, 
in fact, eliminated the presidential guard, a military body that long symbolised the 
confidence of the president in the armed forces. 
this type of leadership should be read in conjunction with several other symbol-
ic elements of a wider style of political communication that emphasises closeness to 
the people and the ending of indulgence and privilege in the realm of politics. This 
represents change in a country where inequality is often embodied in the amount of 
luxury, entourage, and personal security carried by the powerful and wealthy, who 
display their capacity to protect themselves privately from the insecurity that the 
rest of the population is exposed to. AMLo has also rejected use of the presiden-
tial plane (it is on sale) as well as shunned moving into the presidential residence, 
instead turning Los Pinos into a museum. This contrasts to the infamously lavish 
style with which previous presidents and their families conducted themselves. Peña 
nieto, his immediate predecessor, had relied on an expensive apparatus of “social 
communication” to manage his image in the mass media, [2] with only sporadic, 
unidirectional addresses to the people on television – at most borrowing the distant 
telenovela-star aura of his wife. 
At the same time, some features of AMLO’s populist new style of doing and 
communicating politics seem potentially threatening not only to his own image and 
physical well-being, but to democratic institutions. AMLo has conducted “citizen 
consultations” on many of his policy plans. While these exercises would have been 
innocuous if clearly called “surveys,” they turned into a worrisome sign for demo-
cratic institutions when they were misnamed “citizen consultations” – bypassing 
existing rules to call and conduct popular consultations, which normally leave their 
organisation to the electoral authority only in three-year intervals to be concur-
rent with national elections and demand the same standards of high security of the 
secret, single vote. The government plans to carry out a legislative reform to make 
formal popular consultations more flexible than what the current law allows. 
undeniably, the new government encourages more participation beyond the 
usual cheering masses that previous presidents required only as frames for their 
ritually orchestrated encounters with the people. The legislative power has also 
opened up significant new spaces for organised groups to criticise projects in the 
2 Among the hardest 
cuts to any state agency 
in AMLO’s government are 
those to the presidential of-
fice (61 per cent decrease 
relative to the previous 
government).
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making. For instance, in the past months Congress has given space to a passionate 
deliberation in which the most controversial of the president’s projects so far, the 
national Guard, has been vehemently criticised and refined.
The Challenge of Internal Security
More than a decade ago, President Felipe Calderón declared the “war on drugs” and – 
hoping for effective implementation – made the fatal decision to use the country’s 
armed forces for that internal security task. This war led to a spiral of violence on 
the part of both the state and criminal groups. When the latter found it more diffi-
cult to traffic drugs, they expanded their range of mafia activities. With the promise 
to correct that, Calderón’s successor, Peña nieto, offered to create a new corps – 
the National Gendarmerie – to improve security in the country. Yet this new corps 
failed, being understaffed and eventually relegated to a unit within the existent fed-
eral police.
With such a background of failed attempts and ever higher records of violent 
death, President López Obrador began his term with a sombre diagnostic: the coun-
try needs sweeping reorganisation to solve its chaotic security provision infrastruc-
ture, and to extirpate a corruption that has reached up to the very highest echelons 
of government, such as state governors. AMLO is hard pressed to deliver results in 
this area, but while in his campaign he created a narrative of hope and optimism, as 
president he has come to recognise that these are deeply entrenched problems and 
that it is impossible to fulfil the promise of taking the army off the streets anytime 
soon. The president’s idea for a solution is to call into existence a body that has so 
far only existed in the text of the Constitution, arming it with expanded competen-
cies: the Guardia Nacional (National Guard). 
this project poses more dilemmas than any other for AMLo’s young govern-
ment, and seems critical against the backdrop of a broader turn in the region to-
wards the militarisation of politics (Kurtenbach and Scharpf 2018). While he has 
rhetorically distanced his government from the war on drugs, AMLO sees no al-
ternative to legally recognising the indispensable role that the armed forces have 
acquired to provide internal security in vast areas of the country. While for human 
rights activists a return of the army to its barracks cannot come soon enough, broad 
sectors of the population – including subnational governments (who are partly re-
sponsible for not having invested in their own security forces) – have requested the 
president not to withdraw the country’s armed forces. In the short term, this gov-
ernment accepts that it is impossible to revamp the corrupt and inefficient police 
forces that are scattered in a multilevel structure – just as creating and training a 
completely new police force overnight is inconceivable. 
however, from its outset the Guardia nacional project has left much to be de-
sired in terms of needed checks and balances. AMLO is trying to make the Guardia 
nacional happen, and while the project was still being discussed in the lower cham-
ber (the Chamber of Deputies) he already initiated a call for recruitment. Yet many 
voices, some of which are generally sympathetic to the new government, coalesced 
in a powerful critique of the Guardia Nacional’s key characteristics: the nature of 
its command (civil, military, or mixed), its potential capacity to encroach on subna-
tional governments’ own domains, its independence from control by the legislative 
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branch, and its disregard for the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. 
thus, in mid-February the project was subject to public debate in the senate, with 
experts invited to discuss the drafting of related reforms. In its early days in the 
upper chamber (the senate), the project seemed even more geared to militarisa-
tion considering some of the concessions that parliamentarians had made in the 
Chamber of Deputies earlier. however, the consultation with critics held in the 
senate seems to have made an impact. In this top project of AMLo, the legislative 
has proved to be a working check mechanism on his power. this is a significant if 
somewhat preliminary sign that democratic institutions are strong enough to stand 
up to a president who so far commands astounding popular support for his policy 
measures, and an absolute majority in parliament.
In any case, to provide public security AMLO will need more than the Guardia 
Nacional, and since its creation is proving more painstaking than expected, the new 
president has started by tackling state collusion with criminal organisations. AMLO 
is discarding the narrow view of drug trafficking as a priority, and proposing in-
stead a “pacification” road map that contains important elements such as satiating 
the need of so many victims of crime to speak, to be heard, and to hear the truth 
in the nationwide “listening forums” where victims of violence, religious leaders, 
and academics will be consulted on security policy. The considered decriminalisa-
tion of certain drugs and a limited amnesty for non-violent criminals could also 
help, as might the called-for truth commissions to investigate the worst episodes 
of violence (notably the kidnapping and killing of 43 students in 2014 in Iguala, 
Guerrero). however, a priority must also be the training of police forces that are 
properly staffed, well paid, and clearly organised and controlled at all levels, as well 
as a complete revamping of the justice system.
Ambivalent Actors: Military and Public Administration
Beyond the success of these specific policies, a more fragile process unfolding be-
tween the armed forces and the president merits close observation. Over many dec-
ades, Mexico was able to institutionalise compulsory military service with rela tively 
high levels of loyalty to democratic institutions. however, trust has been lacking 
between AMLO and Mexico’s armed forces so far. AMLO criticised the military ap-
paratus before becoming president, but now needs it. To tackle insecurity requires 
readiness from the armed forces to share AMLo’s wider perspective of pacification, and 
to cooperate with the multifarious police structures existing at different levels – neither 
of which are guaranteed (Benitez Manaut 2018). To build trust, one of AMLO’s very 
first public acts as president was to honour the troops and their contribution to 
providing internal security – further giving recognition that they never requested 
to have such role, with it instead being imposed on them by previous presidents. 
Lately, AMLo has offered that the administration of and revenues from his own 
proposed alternative for a new airport – which will be built on the site of an air force 
base – go to the armed forces.
security exemplifies the wider approach that AMLo is proposing to tackle Mex-
ico’s most deeply entrenched and intertwined problems. More than a purely puni-
tive approach to reducing the violence ingrained in society, AMLO’s own one is also 
to construct peace and achieve reconciliation. The heavily publicised apprehensions 
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of drug lords (capos) by army and marine forces in the past did nothing to provide 
justice or security. Instead, they helped to establish the armed forces in a position 
of power (yielding them indispensable), and certainly risked the lives of members of 
the armed forces and civil population alike for a purpose that was too short-sighted. 
The capos do not threaten the population directly, but the rank and file gangsters 
do – as do the widespread structures that uphold their power and the failure to 
prosecute them for their crimes too. In an ineffective justice system, capos can buy 
their escape from prison or even conduct their business from there. When they are 
killed or extradited, the next cadres fight over the leadership of cartels – causing 
violence to expand.
More than the superficial impression of Mexico as a drug-ridden country, in 
recent years the contours of violence have revealed a complex picture in fact: mafias 
extract rents from a multiplicity of illicit sources at different levels, with ramifica-
tions for both legal and illegal business practices. This raises the stakes in combat-
ting these structures, because large parts of society are embedded in them. Some 
criminal organisations have turned into enterprises (Correa-Cabrera 2017) that 
flourish under the protection of local authorities. 
In the short term, AMLo is focusing on measures to fight corruption. Already 
as president-elect he published a proposal made up of 50 of them, including cuts 
to salaries and privileges traditionally tied to high administrative public office. this 
proposal threw corrupt officials who abuse their power into the same pot as all other 
parts of the public administration. soon, not only the diplomatic service and judges 
complained – warning that their capacities could be seriously compromised with 
salary cuts – but numerous units of public administration were downsized – with 
many decrying that a drain of expertise would ensue. It is questionable whether this 
demoralisation of the public administration at large was necessary to legitimise the 
abolition of privileges, which may be morally justifiable, and the budgetary cuts, 
which might have been economically unavoidable within the framework of auster-
ity of AMLo’s government. except for positions newly filled by the government, the 
rest of the very apparatus in charge of implementing its ambitious plans has been 
left potentially understaffed – and antagonised. It certainly seems paradoxical that 
this politically strong new (centre-)left government has jump-started implementa-
tion of its ambitious policies by making the state slimmer.
Combining Social and Austerity Policies
The core of the transformation that AMLO has proclaimed is his plans for economic 
and social policy. From the very beginning his government has pledged to main-
tain Mexico’s path to an open-market and export-oriented economy, even though 
its emphasis is rather on the reduction of inequalities than on economic growth 
per se. Thus, it does not aim to change the fundamental economic orientation of 
the country, but to strengthen the social policy angle; it does aspire to bolstering 
the internal market too, though. The government wants to guarantee marginalised 
groups a decent living by supporting small and medium enterprises, by securing 
local, regional, and national production, and by stimulating consumption through 
higher wages (Mexico has been among the 20 per cent of countries worldwide with 
the lowest salaries for decades). 
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While AMLo’s cancellation of the texcoco airport project provoked uncertainty 
among foreign investors, the peso has remained stable. Important in this regard 
were appointments at the Banco de México signalling that the government will re-
spect its independence. though Mexico’s finances are no longer driven solely by 
oil revenues, this administration hopes to increase the proceeds from natural re-
sources, both by fighting the chronic lack of investment of recent years and reappro-
priating parts of the rents captured by mafia-esque organisations both within and 
outside of PeMeX, the state oil enterprise. however, one of AMLo’s first measures 
to put a stop to theft in the hydrocarbon industries led to interruptions in the fuel 
supply for entire regions of the country for several weeks in January, with impor-
tant consequences for other industries that saw their supply of necessary raw ma-
terials come to a halt. 
AMLO intends to make palpable, as fast as possible, that he delivers on his 
promises of tackling inequality, that by offering opportunities to the most vulnerable 
first – and by changing the approach to social policies in general. During his time as 
president-elect, observers became increasingly nervous as to how he would be able 
to set in motion his social policy plans without indebting the country or raising new 
taxes. Yet, the approval of the budget for his first year of office was welcomed with 
relief. only five out of 26 ministries saw a real budgetary increase relative to previ-
ous years, and their competences reflect AMLo’s own priorities: labour, energy, 
well-being, national defence, and tourism. This includes subsidies and overhauled 
programmes for rural development and agriculture, a programme to create new 
public universities across the country, as well as universal transfer programmes 
for all senior citizens, persons with disabilities, unemployed youths, and students 
of middle school. With all these measures, AMLO scales up to the national level 
the social policies that he had introduced as mayor of Mexico City (2000–2005) 
to the detriment of the well-known conditional transfer programme “Prospera.” 
While there is little to criticise about them in principle, analysts note that they are 
outdated regarding best practices for the operation of social programmes. For in-
stance, they lack a gender perspective and their evaluation mechanisms are fuzzy. 
Moreover, it is worrisome that the Ministry for environment and natural resources 
had one-third of its budget cut. Similarly troubling are the cuts to programmes that 
previous administrations had implemented to allow for the greater participation 
of women in the labour market, and for the sheer protection of women’ rights in a 
country that has appalling statistics regarding violence against them. Also, in line 
with AMLO’s tendency to centralise command over key programmes, new controls 
have been introduced to transfer resources across ministries and downwards to 
state-level governments: supervisors (super-delagados) will report directly to the 
president on how lower levels of government and different bureaucracies employ 
resources devoted to social and security policies. 
While AMLO seems determined to go against elites that have linked their eco-
nomic and political power through collusion and nepotism, there is looming ten-
sion about his capacity to do the same regarding trade unions. Also in view is his 
willingness to expend his political capital on containing social conflict. Inside the 
multicolour landscape of trade unions – some of which are infamous for protecting 
their privileges – there are those who might take advantage of a president who has 
vowed not to repress dissent.
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Migration Policy: A Multidimensional Key Issue
In October and November 2018, as AMLO and his team were preparing to take of-
fice, Mexico was suddenly caught in a very tense situation related to migration. so-
called caravans of migrants from Central America were passing through Mexican 
territory trying to reach the united states in a time of open criminalisation of im-
migration by us President Donald trump. the journey of the approximately 17,000 
migrants received intense coverage from both national and international media, a 
coverage partly prompted by the frequent hostile remarks of Trump. By moving en 
masse, and helped by the spotlight of public awareness as well as by the company 
of Mexican and international organisations, these transnational migrants were able 
to protect themselves from the vulnerability to which such individuals are normally 
exposed when crossing through Mexico. This made manifest a moral incoherence that 
migration activists and experts – but also migrants themselves – have long denounced: 
while Mexican governments are vocal about their own emigrants’ rights abroad (es-
pecially in the us, where 97 per cent of Mexican emigrants concentrate), they have 
neglected to respect the same rights for migrants to and through Mexico – who are 
vulnerable to being abused by authorities or by criminal organisations. 
In a moment of government transition, the migrant exodus also brought to 
the fore the incoherence between legal texts and their implementation. Since 2011, 
Mexico has had a progressive migration law in place and has even elaborated stra-
tegic plans to cope with immigration based on a human rights perspective. These 
norms have been largely non-functional however, partly due to bureaucratic in-
ertia and to a lack of resources for implementation but undeniably also because 
they clashed with the us’ own leanings – pushing Peña nieto to guard the Mexi-
can southern border from further immigration. While achieving more coherence 
on how immigrants and emigrants are treated, as well as between existing laws and 
their implementation, would be already a gain relative to the past, the new govern-
ment proposes to go even further. It recognises that to solve the problems related to 
migration a unilateral approach to restricting the mobility of persons is not only in 
contradiction with Mexican law but has also clearly failed in the past. 
Mexican migration policy seems to be changing drastically, and in a way that 
fits the government’s plans in other spheres. First, the increased attention given to 
migrants in those intense weeks before the new government’s inauguration gave the 
incoming team further justification for investing in the south – which is the exact 
region where AMLo wants to develop large infrastructure projects and tourism. 
second, the government has already used the topic of migration to profile itself in-
ternationally. this applies to Central America mostly: on his first day as president, 
and under the auspices of the economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, AMLo signed an international agreement with the governments of the 
northern triangle (el salvador, Guatemala, and honduras) to seek the comprehen-
sive development of that region. Potentially, however, the ambitions of this strategy 
of foreign policy projection through the lens of migration could reach beyond the 
Central American region (Villamar 2019). Foreign Minister Marcelo ebrard affirmed 
in Marrakesh that Mexico would become a champion of implementing the Global 
Compact for safe, orderly and regular Migration. Migration is an area where the 
new government can illustrate its distance from previous ones, by acknowledging 
that Mexico has acquired a complex role as country of origin, transit, return, and of 
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destination too. Moreover, the AMLO administration recognises that Mexico needs 
both to act in coherence with such a multifaceted role and to collaborate with send-
ing countries as the only path to remedy (at least some of) the structural problems 
that are at the root of the displacement of populations from Mesoamerica. 
this approach is already facing its first hard test. Besides trump’s obsession 
with a wall playing a decisive role in the us itself, the us government also an-
nounced on Christmas eve 2018 that it would only accept small contingents of 
asylum seekers through selected ports of entry at the border – and that it would 
generally return those from Central America to Mexico for them to await the resolu-
tion of their processing there. the first asylum seekers have already been returned, 
making it hard for the Mexican government to save face after it publicly refused to 
become a “safe third country,” and challenging even further the subnational gov-
ernments that already faced tensions in coping with the thousands of migrants who 
remain stuck in border cities. In the short-term, Mexico accepts the returned Cen-
tral American migrants with a humanitarian visa that allows them legal stay and to 
seek employment for twelve months. 
The Challenges of Expectation Management and Institutional Integrity
Starting with a diagnostic of a morally degraded society and the announcement 
of a new epoch, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador is himself to blame for 
to the almost supernatural expectations that accompanied his taking of office. to 
realise his desired national transformation and implement his mandate, AMLO is 
adamant about getting rid of groups that have become cemented in power and who 
have captured rents only for themselves. There is a powerful symbolism in such a 
strategy in a country where inequalities are made more hurtful by the excessive 
privileges of the powerful. In so doing, however, AMLO has gone as far as to get rid 
of hundreds of technocrats in favour of renowned and loyal, but relatively inexpert, 
persons. This bears the risks of centralisation and political manipulation; but, more 
than anything, the broad social support that AMLo enjoys is a double-edged sword: 
he has everything he needs to implement his plan, but also all that it takes to close 
himself off to criticism. 
For observers both inside Mexico and abroad, this is high time to accompany 
the potentially sweeping changes with a constructive approach. More important 
than unfulfilled expectations, which can be taken for granted, Mexico faces the im-
mediate test for its institutions of withstanding the power of a strongly personal-
ised, popularly backed mandate. It is a vital time for all forces in politics to play 
a responsible role in protecting democratic checks and balances. If this is accom-
plished, and even if it falls short of wholesale transformation, whatever steps this 
government takes in its plans to reduce insecurity and inequality will go a long way.
International actors could participate in the regional plans in southern Mexico 
and Central America, where good practice, creativity, long-term commitment, and 
strong willingness will be needed to support the most comprehensive approach 
there has been in a long time for human development in that region. Friendly warn-
ings about the risks involved in some specific plans of the new government could 
also be part of such support. Germany and the european union can play a much 
more important role than in the past, since the North American partners of Mexico 
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are less interested in supporting the specific features of this plan. such involve-
ment would fit with this government’s motivation to diversify Mexico’s relations 
with the wider world. Technical advice from international bodies is also important 
for extensive cooperation on migration policies with sending countries, as well as 
for the design of measurement and control mechanisms within Mexico’s new and 
expanded social policies. 
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